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Chickens and Eggs: Does Custody
Move Support, or Vice-Versa?
by
Margaret F. Brinig*
Introduction
The academic literature presupposes that custody will be de-
termined first, with child support to follow. Further, it assumes
that the duty to pay flows from and is influenced by the parents'
relationship (biological and social) with the child. Some empiri-
cal work confirms this sort of relationship between the two inci-
dents of divorce, as do every state's child support guidelines.
These assumptions will be discussed in Part I.
However, there are some current indications that the direc-
tion of the flow may be ambiguous: that it may sometimes flow
from child support toward custody. On the one hand, web sites
for fathers' rights groups couple the two, suggesting that substan-
tively unfair or, at least, unfairly high child support justifies a de-
mand for equal parenting time. In Illinois, Oregon, and some
other states, enforcement of parenting time orders now mirrors
the stringent remedies mandated for child support.' On the
* Fritz Duda Family Professor of Law, The Notre Dame Law School
1 See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 107.434 (2015). Section 2(c) provides:
(2) In addition to any other remedy the court may impose to enforce
the provisions of a judgment relating to the parenting plan, the court
may:
(a) Modify the provisions relating to the parenting plan by:
(A) Specifying a detailed parenting time schedule;
(B) Imposing additional terms and conditions on the existing
parenting time schedule; or
(C) Ordering additional parenting time, in the best interests
of the child, to compensate for wrongful deprivation of
parenting time;
(b) Order the party who is violating the parenting plan provisions
to post bond or security;
(c) Order either or both parties to attend counseling or educa-
tional sessions that focus on the impact of violation of the parent-
ing plan on children;
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other hand, advocates for women suggest that noncustodial par-
ents seek parenting time that would just reach thresholds to re-
duce the child support they need to pay. They also maintain that
guidelines reflect a desire of noncustodial parents to claim more
time with children than they actually want or will use.2 Since
2014, child support enforcement agencies establishing support
primarily to recoup welfare payments offer voluntary establish-
ment of parenting time arrangements. These arguments sug-
gesting that the first consideration in the determination of
parenting time is child support will be discussed in Part II.
This project, both theoretical and empirical, will develop
these questions, answering some of them in Part III based upon a
large longitudinal study involving parents in Arizona and Indi-
ana. Part IV will present a summary, some directions for further
inquiry, and a tentative conclusion.
(d) Award the prevailing party expenses, including, but not lim-
ited to, attorney fees, filing fees and court costs, incurred in en-
forcing the party's parenting plan;
(e) Terminate, suspend or modify spousal support;
(f) Terminate, suspend or modify child support as provided in
ORS 107.431; or
(g) Schedule a hearing for modification of custody as provided in
ORS 107.135 (11).
The comparable Illinois statutes are 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/607.5 (2016)
(amended by Ill. Pub. Acts 99-763, and listing remedies); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT.
5/10/5.5 (2010) (making visitation interference a crime).
2 See, e.g., William Neely, The Primary Caretaker Parent Rule: Child
Custody and the Dynamics of Greed, 3 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 168, 177 (1985)
("[husbands will] use whatever leverage is available to obtain a favorable settle-
ment. In practice this tends to mean that husbands will threaten custody fights,
with all of the accompanying traumas and uncertainties discussed above, as a
means of intimidating wives into accepting less child support and alimony than
is sufficient to allow the mother to live and raise the children appropriately as a
single parent"). But see William V. Fabricius & Sanford L. Braver, Non-Child
Support Expenditures on Children by Nonresidential Divorced Fathers: Results
of a Study, 41 FAM. CT. REV. 321 (2003) (finding no cliff-like relationship of
expenditures to time in the nonresidential father's home).
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Part I. Perspectives on the Presumed Direction
From Custody to Support
Most, if not all, of the theoretical work on child support pre-
supposes that it becomes an issue only when couples separate,
that is, that the flow moves between custody, with the need to
define post-separation parental roles and time shares, and the
award and payment of child support. When families remain in-
tact, the parents both share custody3 and are jointly responsible
for providing support.4
Historically if the parents separated, not only would the
family wealth be kept with the father,5 but the children would
remain in his care as well. 6 Before the mid-nineteenth century,
3 See, e.g., Kilgrow v. Kilgrow, 107 So. 2d 885 (Ala. 1958) (holding there
could be no action by a father against a mother regarding whether their daugh-
ter should attend parochial school where parents maintained their marriage).
Because of court deference to parental decision-making, see Troxel v. Glanville,
U.S. 530 U.S. 57, 66 (2000), states may not interfere with parents' rights to di-
rect the care and upbringing of their children unless the child's health or safety
is threatened.
4 There might be an action by the state for nonsupport, that is falling
below minimal subsistence levels, see Marsha Garrison, Autonomy or Commu-
nity? An Evaluation of Two Models of Parental Obligation, 86 CAL. L. REV. 41,
49 (1998), or to declare the children dependent because of parental neglect, see,
e.g., 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 405/2-3 (West 2016.):
(1) Those who are neglected include:
(a) any minor under 18 years of age who is not receiving the
proper or necessary support, education as required by law, or
medical or other remedial care recognized under State law as
necessary for a minor's well-being, or other care necessary for
his or her well-being, including adequate food, clothing and
shelter.
This would not include actions between the two parents because of the doctrine
of "family autonomy"; cf McGuire v. McGuire, 59 N.W.2d 336 (Neb. 1953) (the
wife could not maintain an action for support against the husband so long as
they still lived together). Nor may actions be brought on behalf of the children.
5 See EDWARD SHORTER, THE MAKING OF THE MODERN FAMILY 72
(1978); John D. Johnston, Jr., Sex and Property: The Common Law Tradition,
the Law School Curriculum, and Developments Toward Equality, 47 N.Y.U. L.
REv. 1033, 1045-46 (1972); Joan Krauskopf & Rhonda C. Thomas, Partnership
Marriage: The Solution to an Ineffective and Inequitable Law of Support, 35
OHIO ST. L.J. 558, 563 (1974).
6 See, e.g., LENORE WEITZMAN, THE MARRIAGE CONTRAcT 2 (1981).
Until the mid-nineteenth century, the husband was responsible for rearing the
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the mother was often not able to provide support because she
was unlikely to have an independent income or source of
wealth.7 As Marsha Garrison notes, the laws of child support
began with the Elizabethan Poor Laws, which, in her words
"transformed moral duties of family members toward each other
and of the community toward its members-into legal
obligations." 8
The literature suggests that the duty to make monetary pay-
ments is typically owed by the noncustodial parent. 9 (I realize, of
course, that there can be issues regarding the identity of the
payor'0 and that there are criminal" and civil1 2 actions possible
children. See, e.g., 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF EN-
GLAND 446-54 (T. Cooley ed. 1899); Robert C. Brown, Comment, The Custody
of Children, 2 IND. L.J. 325 (1927); Jamil S. Zainaldin, The Emergence of a
Modern American Family Law: Child Custody, Adoption, and the Courts, 1796-
1851, 73 Nw. U.L. REV. 1038, 1045-51 (1979). See also SHORTER, supra note 5,
at 67; Krauskopf & Thomas, supra note 5, at 562.
7 See, e.g., Garrison, supra note 4, at 50 & n.44 (noting that property
belonged to husbands); Martha Minow, How Should We Think About Child
Support Duties?, in FATHERS UNDER FIRE: THE REVOLUTION IN CHILD SuP-
PORT ENFORCEMENT 302, 307 (Irwin Garfinkel et al., eds., 2001); Zainaldin,
supra note 6, at 1052-53 (discussing patriarchal authority).
8 Garrison, supra note 4, at 49.
9 See, e.g., Carolyn Bryson et al., Child Maintenance: How Would the
British Public Calculate What the State Should Require Parents to Pay?, Nuffield
Foundation (2015), http://www.nuffieldfoundation.org/sites/default/files/files/
Attitudesmaintenance_v_FINAL(2).pdf ; Ira M. Ellman, Sanford J. Braver &
Robert J. MacCoun, Intuitive Lawmaking: The Example of Child Support, 6 J.
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 69 (2009). The flow to the custodial parent tends to
occur because historically, if not actually today, custody has been awarded to
the parent who shared the greatest role in the child's day-to-day care during the
relationship, the so-called primary caretaker. J.B. v A.B., 242 S.E.2d 248
(W.Va. 1978); Richard Neely, The Primary Care Parent Rule: Child Custody
and the Dynamics of Greed, 3 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 168 (1984). Because this
parent took on more caretaking responsibilities, she (typically) could not or did
not work as many hours in the labor force as did her husband, and therefore
earned less. In Martha Fineman's terminology, the mother necessarily became
derivatively dependent. MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED
MOTHER, THE SEXUAL FAMILY AND OTHER TWENTIETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES
162-63 (1995). See also Garrison, supra note 4, at 52 ("Another factor was the
common status of women and children as economic dependents of the family's
male breadwinner.")
10 Most payors are biological or adoptive parents. Paternity actions may
be brought by either parent to prove or contest biological parenthood. Some
Vol. 29, 2017 Does Custody Move Support, or Vice-Versa? 273
when parents refuse1 3 or neglect1 4 to provide support to depen-
states place responsibility for payment of child support during an intact mar-
riage on a stepparent. See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 252A.3 (2009); N.Y. FAM.
CT. Acr § 415 (McKinney, 2016, chapters 1 to 396) (preventing from becoming
public charge); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 108.045 (2005); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 26.16.205 (2008) (terminating on dissolution). Recently, responsibility
for paying support for non-biological children, particularly (but by no means
exclusively) in same-sex couples, has developed based upon the growing num-
ber of children conceived through assisted reproductive technology and/or sur-
rogacy. See, e.g., Linda D. Elrod, A Child's Perspective of Defining a Parent:
The Case for Intended Parenthood, 25 BYU J. PUB. L. 245, 248 (2011); Laura
W. Morgan, Child Support: Fifty Years Later, 42 FAM. L.Q. 365 (2008).
11 Criminal contempt remedies are included under the REVISED UNI-
FORM RECIPROCAL ENFORCEMENT OF SUPPORT AcT §§ 801-02 (Unif. Law
Comm'n 2008).
12 Enforcement of child support has been the subject of a number of fed-
eral statutes, see, e.g., 42 U.S.C.A. § 666 (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 114-244),
and uniform state acts, see, e.g., the REVISED UNIFORM RECIPROCAL ENFORCE-
MENT OF SUPPORT Acr (formulated in 1992, with revisions in 1996). A general
discussion of some of these remedies is available in CARL E. SCHNEIDER &
MARGARET F. BRINIG, AN INVITATION To FAMILY LAW 1275-87 (3d ed. 2006).
13 Some noncustodial parents simply cannot afford to pay child support
and struggle merely to survive on their own. States typically set aside some
amount of income for the parents' support. See, e.g., Jane C. Venohr, Child
Support Guidelines and Guidelines Reviews: State Differences and Common Is-
sues, 47 FAM. L.Q. 327, 340-41 (2015). If the income falls below this amount
once the presumptive child support is calculated, either a reduced or no child
support will be awarded. See, e.g., Arizona Child Support Guidelines: Adopted
by the Arizona Supreme Court, Effective July 1, 2015, at 14-5, http://
www.azcourts.gov/Portals/31/Child`%2OSupport/2015CSGuidelinesRED.pdf
(last visited Mar. 23, 2016) ("Self support reserve test" currently set at $1115
per month). For indigents, other states make child support amounts discretion-
ary on a case-by-case basis. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61.30(6)(a) (2011). In
New York, the minimum is set by statute at $25 or $50, depending upon income
and the need of the child, if the obligor's income falls below the federal poverty
level ($11,770 in 2015). N.Y. Dom. REL. L. § 240 (1-b) (2016). A table of the
various state treatments of low income child support obligors can be found at
the National Conference of State Legislatures, http://www.ncsl.org/research/
human-services/states-treatment-of-low-high-income-child-support.aspx (last
visited Mar. 23, 2016). For a critique, see Garrison, supra note 4, at 71: "The
prevalence of this feature thus suggests a tendency to view parental income as
parental entitlement," and as departing from Lockean principles of parental
obligations, id. at 87.
14 Even in a family that is not divorcing, a parent who does not provide
support to children may have them declared dependent, or parental rights ter-
minated, for failure to support them. Non-support is also a crime. For a list of
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dent children.15 None of these are the subjects of this piece,
however.)
Some empirical work confirms this direction of movement
between the custody and child support awards. For example,
Judith Seltzer,1 6 Yoram Weiss and Robert Willis,' 7 and Margaret
Brinig and F.H. Buckley,' 8 before and during the 1990s, showed
that more frequent access to children and more authority in rais-
ing them, so-called joint legal custody, were associated with more
adherence to court ordered support. This intuition has been con-
firmed since the turn of the century by the research team from
the Institute for Poverty at the University of Wisconsin.1 9 Fur-
ther, psychologist Robert Emery and his colleagues have demon-
strated that mediated child custody decisions tend to result in
higher payment of child support.20 In fact, one impetus of the
the statutes in the fifty states. See National Conference of State Legislatures,
Criminal Nonsupport and Child Support, http://www.ncsl.org/research/human-
services/criminal-nonsupport-and-child-support.aspx (last visited Feb. 20, 2016).
15 At least in theory, obligors cannot be jailed if they cannot pay. See, e.g.,
Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660 (1983); Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235
(1970); but see Mike Brunker, Unable to Pay Child Support, Poor Parents
Jailed, NBC NEWS (Sept. 12, 2011), http://www.nbcnews.com/id/44376665/ns/
usnews-crimeand courts/t/unable-pay-child-support-poor-parents-land-be-
hind-bars/#.VuQSMeFEqY.
16 Judith A. Seltzer, Legal Custody Arrangements and Children's Eco-
nomic Welfare, 96 AM. J. Soc. 895 (1996) (linking so-called legal custody and
the payment of child support); see also Judith A. Seltzer, Family Ties After Di-
vorce: The Relationship Between Visiting and Paying Child Support, 51 J. MAR-
RIAGE & FAM. 1013 (1989).
17 Yoram Weiss & Robert Willis, Transfers Among Divorced Couples: Ev-
idence and Interpretation, 11 J LAB. ECON. 629 (1993). See also Joyce A. Arditti
& Timothy Z. Keith, Visitation Frequency, Child Support Payment, and the Fa-
ther-Child Relationship Postdivorce, 55 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 699 (1993).
18 Margaret F. Brinig & F.H. Buckley, Joint Custody: Bonding and Moni-
toring Theories, 73 IND. L.J. 393 (1998).
19 Lawrence M. Berger et al., The Stability of Shared Child Physical
Placements in Recent Cohorts of Divorced Wisconsin Families, Institute of Pov-
erty, University of Wisconsin-Madison, Discussion Paper 1329-07 (2007),
www.irp.wisc.edu/publications/dps/pdfs/dpl32907.pdf. See also Chien-Chung
Huang et al., Child Support Enforcement, Joint Legal Custody, and Parental
Involvement, 77 Soc. SERV. REV. 255 (2003); Marygold S. Melli & Patricia R.
Brown, Exploring a New Family Form: The Shared Time Family, 22 INT'L J.L.,
POL'Y & FAM. 231 (2008).
20 See, e.g., ROBERT E. EMERY, RENEGOTIATING FAMILY RELATION-
SHIPS: DIVORCE, CHILD CUSTODY, AND MEDIATION (2d ed. 2012); Robert E.
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custody mediation movement has been to strengthen and stabi-
lize parental relationships (custody) to secure more support, sta-
bility, and security.21 Child support guidelines that adjust to
account for shared parenting also presuppose that custodial ar-
rangements determine (or at least affect) child support.22 That is,
as parents assume more time with children, they relieve the pri-
marily custodial (or other, in the case of equally shared time)
parent of some proportion of the expenses she would otherwise
make.2 3 This article will later discuss to what extent these as-
sumptions are correct.
Section H. Suggestions That Child Support
Moves Custody
There are some indications that the assumed direction of
flow from custody to child support may have become ambiguous.
Web sites for fathers' rights groups couple the two incidents of
parenting, but suggest that compelled, consequently unfair, child
support "tribute" supports demanding equal parenting time. 2 4 In
Emery, David Sbarra & Tara Grover, Divorce Mediation: Research and Reflec-
tions, 43 FAM. CT. REV. 22, 27 (2005); Katherine M. Kitzmann & Robert E.
Emery, Child and Family Coping One Year After Mediated and Litigated Child
Custody Disputes, 8 J. FAM. PSYCH. 150 (1994).
21 See Venohr, supra note 13, at 341-42 (proponents argue that "it is fair
to recognize the nonresidential parent's direct expenditures on the child while
the child is in his or her care."). See also Huang et al., supra note 19; Carl L.
Tishler, Laura Landry-Meyer & Suzanne Bartholomae, Mediation and Child
Support: An Effective Partnership, 38 J. DIVORCE & REMARRIAGE 129 (2003).
22 For a critical assessment, see Karen Syma Czapanskiy, The Shared Cus-
tody Child Support Adjustment: Not Worth the Candle, 49 FAM. L.Q. 409 (2015).
For more enthusiasm, see Sanford L. Braver, Ira M. Ellman & William V.
Fabricius, Public SentimentsAbout the Parenting Time Adjustment in Child Sup-
port Awards, 49 FAM. L.Q. 433 (2015).
23 Braver, Ellman & Fabricius, supra note 22; Czapanskiy, supra note 22.
24 See, e.g., Thread Millions [$] in Charity but not One Cent in Tribute,
Child Support, SouTHERN MARYLAND ONLINE, forums.somd.com/. . ./67336-
Millions-in-Charity-but-not-one-cent-in-Tribute (last visited Feb. 19, 2016); Sup-
porting All Children: Balancing the Scales for Support of Every Child, FA-
THERs4KIDs, fathers4kids.com/child-support (last visited Feb. 19, 2016). See
also David Chambers, The Coming Curtailment of Compulsory Child Support,
80 MICH. L. REV. 1614, 1624 (1982) ("over time many fathers come to regard
child support as a form of taxation without representation."). In some ways, this
reason seems analogous to the "pay to play" movement in youth sports. See,
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Illinois,25 Oregon,26 and a growing number of other states,27
methods for enforcing parenting time or visitation orders now
mirror the stringent remedies mandated for child support. Child
e.g., Ann Killion, Paying to Play Is New Normal for Youth Athletes, SFGATE
(Oct. 18, 2013), http://www.sfgate.com/sports/article/Paying-to-play-is-new-nor-
mal-for-youth-athletes-4902034.php.
25 Beginning January 1, 2016, parenting time orders may be enforced by a
host of remedies, including revision of the existing parenting time order to clar-
ify any unclear issues, 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/607.5(c)(1) (West, Westlaw
through P.A. 99-904 of the 2016 Reg. Sess.); sending the offending parent (or
both parents) to a parenting class at the expense of the offending parent, 5/
607.5(c)(2); sending both parents to individual or family counseling, 5/
607.5(c)(3); requiring the offending parent to post a cash bond (paid to the
Clerk of the Court) to ensure future compliance (if the offending parent vio-
lates the parenting schedule again, the bond may be forfeited to the other par-
ent to reimburse for expenses for the child), 5/607.5(c)(4); make up parenting
time of the same type and of the same duration, 5/607.5(c)(5); finding the of-
fending parent to be in "indirect, civil contempt of court" which automatically
requires reimbursement of attorney's fees, allows for the suspension of the of-
fending parent's Illinois driver's license, allows the court to place the offending
parent on probation - meaning the court places "conditions" on the proba-
tion) 5/607.5(f). A violation of the conditions of probation, or another violation
of the parenting schedule, will result in jail time of up to six months, and/or a
civil fine or criminal fine of up to $500 per offense; a notification to the state
police who maintain a data base of the history of all parenting order violations
and make it available to all local law enforcement agencies; reimbursement of
attorney's fees, court costs, and related legal expenses; and any other provision
that may promote the child's best interests. Id.
26 OR. REv. STAT. ANN. § 107.434 (West, Westlaw through 2016 Reg.
Sess. legislation eff. through 7/1/16) details that the court may: specify a more
detailed parenting time schedule; impose additional terms and conditions on
the existing parenting time schedule; order additional parenting time, in the
best interests of the child, to compensate for the wrongful denial of parenting
time; order a party who is violating the parenting plan to post bond or security;
order either or both of the parties to attend counseling or educational classes
that focus on the impact that the violation of parenting time has on children;
and award the prevailing party the filing fees and court costs they have incurred
in enforcing the parenting plan. Contempt is also available under OR. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 33.015 (West, Westlaw through 2016 Reg. Sess. legislation eff.
through 7/1/16).
27 See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518.175 (West, Westlaw through legisla-
tion through the end of the 2016 Regular Session), subd. 6 (compensatory visi-
tation time allowed and other remedies mandated by Chapter 30, S.F.No. 1191,
which took effect in 2015). The traditional remedies are spelled out in Joy M.
Feinberg & Lori S. Loeb, Custody and Visitation Interference: Alternative Reme-
dies, 12 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. L. 271 (1994).
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support enforcement agencies study whether or how often non-
custodial parents seek parenting time that would barely reach
thresholds for reduction in child support.28 Since 2014, child sup-
port enforcement agencies establishing support primarily to
recoup Temporary Assistance to Needy Families 29 (welfare) pay-
ments offer voluntary establishment of parenting time arrange-
ments at the time of the court proceeding.30 Some feminist
scholars, concerned about the parenting time drift first noted by
Eleanor Maccoby and Robert Mnookin in the 1990s, 31 question
whether the modern increases in parenting time reflect a desire
28 See, e.g., Ira Mark Ellman, A Case Study in Failed Law Reform: Ari-
zona's Child Support Guidelines, 54 ARIz. L. REV. 137 (2012); Jane Venohr &
Rasa Kaunelis, Arizona Child Support Guidelines Review: Findings from Case
File Data 12-13 (2008), http://www.azcourts.gov/Portals/31/Child%2OSupport/
2008CSGRED.pdf.
29 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 601-619 (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 114-244).
30 See S.B. 1870 (113th Cong.) § 303 (Preventive, Sex Trafficking and
Strengthening Families Act); Stacy L. Brustin & Lisa V. Martin, Paved With
Good Intentions: Unintended Consequences of Federal Proposal to Integrate
Child Support and Parenting Time, 48 IND. L. REV. 803 (2015). Brustin and
Martin may not have been aware that Indiana has offered parenting time in
paternity cases since 1997, defaulting to the usual parenting time guidelines
where a paternity affidavit under IND. CODE ANN. § 16-37-2-2.1 (West, Westlaw
through all legislation of the 2016 Second Reg. Sess. of the 119th General As-
sembly) has been executed. If paternity is established through a default action
under IND. CODE ANN. § 31-14-8-2 (West, Westlaw through all legislation of the
2016 Second Reg. Sess. of the 119th General Assembly), sole custody and a
gatekeeper role will remain in the mother. IND. CODE ANN. § 31-14-14-1 (West,
Westlaw through all legislation of the 2016 Second Reg. Sess. of the 119th Gen-
eral Assembly) provides:
(a) A noncustodial parent is entitled to reasonable parenting time
rights unless the court finds, after a hearing, that parenting time might:
(1) endanger the child's physical health and well-being; or
(2) significantly impair the child's emotional development.
The Guidelines applicability stems from the following statement by the Indiana
Rules of Court, Parenting Time Guidelines, http://www.in.gov/judiciary/rules/
parenting/ (last visited May 19, 2016)): "These Guidelines are applicable to all
child custody situations, including paternity cases and cases involving joint legal
custody where one person has primary physical custody."
31 ELEANOR E. MACCOBY & ROBERT H. MNOOKIN, DIVIDING THE
CHILD: SOCIAL AND LEGAL DILEMMAS OF CUSTODY (1998).
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of noncustodial parents to opportunistically claim more time with
children than they actually want or will use. 3 2
32 For discussions of "maternal drift," see, e.g., DEBORAH ANNA
LUEPNITZ, CHILD CUSTODY: A STUDY OF FAMILIES AFTER DIVORCE (1982);
Richard Cloutier & Christian Jacques, Evolution of Residential Custody Ar-
rangements in Separated Families: A Longitudinal Study, 28 J. DIVORCE & RE-
MARRIAGE 17 (1997); Department of Justice, Canada, Child Custody
Arrangements: Their Characteristics and Outcomes, 2004-FCY-3E, at 20 & Ta-
ble 1 (Canadian data from 1994-95), http://www.justice.gc.caleng/rp-pr/fl-1f/par-
ent/2004_3/pdf/2004_3e.pdf (last visited Feb. 20, 2016); Belinda Fehlberg &
Christine Millward, Post-separation Parenting and Financial Arrangements Over
Time, 92 FAM. MATTERS 29, 32 (2013) (presenting a qualitative study in Austra-
lia); Jessica Pearson & Nancy Thoennes, Custody After Divorce: Demographic
and Attitudinal Patterns, 60 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 233 (1990); Marsha
Pruett et al., Children's Adjustment in Joint and Sole Physical Custody Families,
23 DEV. PSYCHOL. 430 (1989). Finding no such patterns in more recent Wiscon-
sin cases (largely self-selected), see Berger et al., supra note 19. For discussions
of the tendency to ask for more custody in order to pay less child support, see,
e.g., Venohr, supra note 13, at 342 ("low thresholds [of shared custody multipli-
ers] encourage parents to bargain for the time sharing arrangement to raise or
lower the support award."); See also Marygold S. Melli & Patricia Brown, in
The Economics of Shared Custody: Developing an Equitable Formula for Dual
Residence, 31 Hous. L. REV. 543, 546 (1994) (commenting that a reason why
shared custody has a "bad reputation with child support policy makers is the
view that the interest of secondary parents in shared custody is primarily in
reduced child support, not in time with their children."). Eleanor Maccoby con-
tends that when the California divorce legislation was changed so that child
support payments were linked to the amount of time spent by the children in
the second residence, there was a sudden increase in the number of requests for
modification of custody and child support awards. "Fathers were claiming that
their children needed to be with them more, and that they themselves wanted
and needed to have more time with their children." Eleanor Maccoby, The
Custody of Children in Divorcing Families: Weighing the Alternatives, in THE
POSTDIVORCE FAMILY: CHILDREN, PARENTING, AND SOCIETY 62 (Ross A.
Thompson & P. R. Amato eds., 1999). Maccoby suggests that these variation
requests were being made in order to bring the number of days "to the 129
overnights a year that would allow [fathers] to be designated as joint physical
custodians and hence to pay less child support." Id. at 63. See also Helen
Rhoades et al., Posing as Reform: The Case of the Family Law Reform Act, 14
AUSTRALIAN J. FAM. L. 142-59 (2000).
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Section IH. Considerations From New Empirical
Work
As mentioned, this paper examines at least some of the di-
rectional issues based upon a longitudinal study of more than one
thousand divorcing and separating couples in two U.S. states.33
This analysis considers a subset of cases involving payment (or at
least establishing the duty to pay) for 256 fathers in Indiana and
410 divorcing fathers in Arizona. 34
For readers who may wish a very informal statistics re-
fresher, correlations describe a relationship between two vari-
ables. They do not make statistical claims about what might be
causing the relationship (which direction the relationship flows),
and do not rule out other causes that might affect both and there-
fore the result.35 Regression analysis statistically removes some
of these problems. If the predicted result (output) occurs after
33 The methods and procedures of the study, involving case file records
from Arizona and Indiana that originated in 2008 and were followed until 2014,
is detailed at some length in Margaret F. Brinig, Result Inequality in Family
Law, 49 AKRON L. Rnv. 471 (2016) (describing differences based upon income,
marital status, ethnicity, and domestic violence). The primary source of the in-
come and parenting time data is the child support worksheet filled out when
support is sought and custody or support modified. It is sometimes attached to
the parenting plan or divorce decree in the files. The two counties involved in
Arizona are Maricopa and Pima, which comprise about 70% of the state's pop-
ulation and its two largest cities, Phoenix and Tucson. The five in Indiana are
Lake (Gary and Hammond), Marion (Indianapolis), Monroe (Bloomington),
Posey (Mt. Vernon) and St. Joseph (South Bend). The Indiana sample was de-
liberately chosen to include counties that were demographically different but
that kept electronic records, and represents cases from counties comprising
27.4% of the 2006 population.
34 While mothers were the noncustodial parents in roughly 10% of the
cases, and occasionally did have to pay child support, because of the small num-
ber and because control variables would be different (for example, mothers'
rather than fathers' incomes would need to be held constant), they were omit-
ted in this paper. Divorcing parents were utilized because the income and custo-
dial times were largely complete in virtually all cases. (The exceptions were in a
few default divorces where the noncustodial fathers could not be personally
served so that the court did not make child support orders under the authority
of Kulko v. Superior Court of California, 436 U.S. 84 (1978)).
35 Two variables that move together perfectly will have a correlation of 1.
Two whose relationship is essentially random will have a correlation of 0. Sta-
tistically significant correlations occur when the probability that the two are not
related (are random) falls below .05 (usually denoted by * in the literature) or,
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the time of the independent (input) variables, it is at least consis-
tent with the idea that causation goes in the direction from the
earlier predictor to the later effect. To the extent that other
likely causes are held constant, and a great deal of the variance in
the result is explained, the inference of causation becomes
stronger. This set of results uses both types of statistical analy-
sis.3 6 Table I presents the basic statistical information on the two
sets of data studied, coming from the two rather different states
that also have different child custody and child support regimes.
One similarity is that neither state law uses the customary "cus-
tody" terminology. In accordance with the more modern trend,
both refer instead to "parenting time."37  The state
demographics, procedural structures, and family law rules other-
wise diverge, and these differences can be seen in Table I, which
describes the populations in the data studied in the two states.
better yet, below .01 (usually denoted by **) or below .001 (usually denoted by
***). See, e.g., BRUCE E. HANSEN, ECONOMETRICS 189 and § 8.6 (2d ed. 2016).
36 There are two types of regressions employed here, depending upon
whether the dependent variable (what the other data explain) can be answered
with a yes-no question or whether it is continuous over some range. The first
type, called a logistic regression, predicts the probability that a "yes" answer
will occur. R2 here describes how much is explained compared to chance. The
name "Cox and Snell" comes from D.R. Cox & E.J. SNELL, ANALYSIS OF Bi-
NARY DATA (2d ed. 1989). The second type, called an ordinary least squares
regression, predicts the best line that theoretically could be drawn through all
the dependent variable results. R2 here describes how much of the total vari-
ance in the dependent variable (output) can be explained by the equation. See,
e.g., Fumio HAYASHI, ECONOMETRICS (2000). Relationships between the vari-
ous independent (input) variables and the output variable, also called partial
regressions because the results hold the other variables constant, are again ex-
amined for statistical significance as explained in the preceding footnote.
3 See, e.g., Herbie DiFonzo, There's a Great Way to Figure out Child Cus-
tody. Most Divorce Courts Don't Use It, WASH. PosT, Nov. 13, 2014 ("'Decision
making' and 'parenting time' are replacing 'legal custody' and 'physical cus-
tody.' The modern terms reflect a cultural pivot toward mutual child rearing
responsibilities rather than declaring a winner and a loser.").
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Table I. Descriptive Variables (Indiana and
Arizona)
Variable Mean (Arizona)38  Mean (Indiana) 39
Gross Income of Father $4092.05 $3262.65
Proportion of Income in Child .142 .220
Support
Days of Parenting Time 99.03 73.148
Cases With Motions for Child .112 .248
Support Enforcement
Motions by Fathers to Increase .125 .165
Their Parenting Time
Motions by Mothers to Decrease .099 .052
Fathers' Parenting Time
Motions to Reduce Child Support .225 .287
Allegations of Post-Decree 
.085 .039
Domestic Violence
Table I shows that the Indiana fathers earn somewhat less
and spend a slightly higher proportion of their income on child
support. They also spend less time with their children, according
to the parenting time orders, than do the Arizona fathers. Indi-
ana divorcing mothers are more than twice as likely to seek child
support enforcement, but are only half as likely to seek reduc-
tions in the father's visitation time, and only half as likely to re-
port post-decree domestic violence.40 Reasons for each of these
differences, to the extent they stem from the legal systems in
place, will be discussed below.
One question that the data can help answer supports and
extends the frequent finding that more contact with noncustodial
parents, primarily fathers, increases their likelihood of paying
38 The number of valid observations (N) varied from 413 to 463; valid N
(the same case included entries for all of the variables analyzed) = 404.
39 The Ns varied from 194 to 256; valid N equaled 178. Income is
computed weekly in Indiana for calculating child support, so was multiplied by
52 and divided by 12 to make the income comparable to Arizona's monthly
income.
40 This could be violence directed by either parent against the other, ei-
ther against a child, or violence to or by a step-parent or cohabitant. These
were coded whenever alleged, whether or not legally substantiated through
hearings.
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child support.41 We know from this literature that higher levels
of visitation, parenting time, or contact generally does increase
the likelihood that fathers eventually will pay support. What the
earlier work does not consider is how difficult it is to collect the
support. In other words, in order to eventually receive the sup-
port, did the mother need to resort to court or the local child
support enforcement agency? 42 The question my data suggest is
therefore a bit different from what has been examined before:
does the likelihood that the mother will need to seek court help
in enforcing child support relate to how much custodial time the
father receives or to his income? Here the dependent, or output,
variable is whether the custodial mother had to bring an action at
some point after the divorce to collect the support.43 This would
not count cases in which wage garnishment began automatically
when the divorce was entered, but such payments continued
through the following years.44 Typically, several months' arrear-
age would have accumulated before she began the enforcement
41 See, e.g., Lenna Nepomnyaschny, Child Support and Father-Child Con-
tact: Testing Reciprocal Pathways, 44 DEMOGRAPHY 93 (2007); H. Elizabeth Pe-
ters et al., Legislating Love: The Effect of Child Support and Welfare Policies
on Father-child Contact, 2 REV. ECON. OF THE HOUSEHOLD 255 (2004); Judith
A. Seltzer, Nora Cate Schaeffer & Hong-wen Charng, Family Ties After Di-
vorce: The Relationship Between Visiting and Paying Child Support, 51 J. MAR-
RIAGE & FAM. 1013 (1989).
42 That is, the reported numbers reflect formal and informal payments.
For a discussion, see Julia Goldberg, Coparenting and Nonresident Fathers'
Monetary Contributions to Their Children, 77 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 612 (2015),
noting that for indigent and minority parents, there may also be compensation
through services (in-kind) or provision of specific goods like disposable diapers
and formula (using data from the Fragile Families study, coparenting has a
stronger effect on fathers' payments than payments do on co-parenting).
43 She might have to bring multiple actions, but in this study the variable
was coded only once (so that it is binary 0 or 1).
44 In some cases, with cooperative co-parents, payments are made directly
from father to mother without any garnishment. Historically, fathers might
have to miss at least one payment for garnishment to be ordered. This changed
under the Child Support Assistance Act, in the section now codified as 42
U.S.C. § 666.Wage garnishment of course is improbable if the father is self-
employed. See Julian Aguilar, Ducking Child Support by Becoming a "Contrac-
tor," TEX. TRm. (Apr. 2, 2015), https://www.texastribune.org/2015/04/02/busi-
ness-owners-lawmakers-set-sights-child-support/.
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action.45 What Table II shows is that while the number of days of
parenting time does not significantly change the likelihood of
resorting to courts to enforce child support, and the father's in-
come does not matter to the likelihood of an enforcement, the
proportion of income paid in child support by the father statisti-
cally does (at p < .076). We cannot tell whether this is because
the father had (relatively) greater financial power at the time of
divorce, but it does not seem to be because the father is likely to
fall behind in payments because he is unemployed or underem-
ployed.46 The results would not support an assertion that child
support will be easier to collect from fathers with shared custody,
however.47
Table H. Likelihood of Child Support
Enforcement in Indiana48 (Logistic Regression;
Standard Errors in Parentheses)
Variable B Sig. Exp(B)
Days of Parenting Time .004 292 1.004(.004) .22 1.0
Proportion of Father's Income Paid in Child 3.166 076 23.721
Support (1.783) .
Gross Income of Father .000 .537 1.000
-1.703
Constant (.651) .009 .182
45 For those mothers receiving public assistance (Temporary Assistance to
Needy Families, or TANF), the agency would sometimes seek to collect back
child support, some proportion of which would not be paid to the mother but to
the welfare authority to reimburse for earlier payments. Public assistance re-
coupment was involved 20.9% of the time in the Indiana sample, and 7.5% of
the time in Arizona.
46 Only 23 fathers listed "unemployed" as their occupation at the time of
the divorce in 2008-09, and an additional 5 persons were incarcerated. This does
not count the 146 for whom an occupation (or lack thereof) could not be ascer-
tained from the file.
47 They would have been supportive if the sign on the coefficient had
been negative (more time equals fewer motions for enforcement).
48 Cox and Snell R2= .041. This number is very small. It means that very
little of the variance is actually explained by either of the two independent
variables.
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The answer to the question posed is that in the data, parenting
time does not significantly relate to the likelihood of enforce-
ment by the custodial parent (though the sign is positive-more
time with the child does not lead to fewer enforcement actions),
though the proportion of the father's income paid in child sup-
port does. This proportion will be highest for low and middle
income couples.
Similarly, in Arizona, neither the father's income, nor the
number of parenting time days (visitation or custody) were sig-
nificantly related to child support enforcement. In this state,
again, the proportion paid in child support is related to the likeli-
hood of an enforcement action, and again the direction is posi-
tive. Again, the results do not support an assertion that more
shared parenting 49 will make fathers more likely to pay the court-
ordered support (though they do not prove the opposite).
Table III. Likelihood of Child Support
Enforcement in Arizona (Logistic Regression;
Standard Errors in Parentheses)so
Variable B Sig. Exp(B)
Father's Days of Parenting Time .003 .519 1.003
Proportion of Father's Income Paid in Child 5.292: 067 198.833
Support (2.891) .
Gross Income of Father .000 .176 1.000(.000)
Constant 
-2.947) .001 .052(.878)
Table IV indicates that parenting time is significantly and
negatively related to the proportion of the father's income that is
paid in child support. This is presumably because in Indiana51
49 In fact, the average (mean) number of parenting time days in Arizona
was 105, nearly the threshold 30% used in Wisconsin to signify shared custody
in Berger et al., rupra note 19.
50 Cox and Snell R2 = .022. T denotes statistical significance at p < .10.
51 See IND. RULES OF CT., CHILD SUPPORT RULES AND GUIDELINES,
Guideline 6, Parenting Time Credit, http://www.in.gov/judiciary/rules/child-sup
port/#g6. These are quite complicated because they (1) take effect only after the
child spends 52 overnights at the noncustodial parent's home, (2) only count
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(and Arizona),52 the amount of child support payable is reduced
by the Guidelines as more time is spent with the child.
Table IV. Relationship Between Parenting Time
and Proportion of Income Paid in Child
Support (Indiana)
Proportion of
Income Paid
in Child
Support
Pearson Correlation -.210**
Parenting Time Days Credited for Sig. (2-tailed) .007
Child SupportN16
N 163
Table V demonstrates that motions by Indiana fathers to re-
duce the amount of child support owed occur more often as the
total amount of child support increases. While of course the two
are related (since child support is calculated based upon fathers'
and mothers' incomes 53), it is interesting that it is the amount,
rather than the proportion, that seems to matter most. The pro-
portion spent on child support will be higher for lower income
variable as opposed to fixed or duplicated costs, and (3) will be subject to devia-
tion if the parent cannot support the child given a reduction.
52 ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-320 (Westlaw through Second Regular
Session of the Fifty-Second Legislature (2016). Section (D)(8) provides that
"[t]he duration of parenting time and related expenses" shall be one of the
criteria. While Schedule A to the child support guidelines subtracts some per-
centage from the amount otherwise owed for various levels of parenting days
(computed in six hour increments) up to 48.6% (for 182 days), Schedule B, in
effect when custody is shared equally, subtracts the lower earning parent's total
amount due from the higher, and then divides the difference in two. Since Ari-
zona also has no multiplier for the expenses that must be duplicated in cases
where children are spending a significant amount of time in each home, the
result is that a number of shared custody fathers in Arizona pay little or no
child support. See Brinig, supra note 33, at 480. For the 170 fathers spending at
least 161 days per year with the child, 32% paid no child support and 60% paid
less than $200 monthly. For a comparison to other states (showing that the Ari-
zona results are the lowest, see Venohr & Kaunelis, supra note 28, at 50.
53 This is called the income shares (IS) rule. See, e.g., Douglas W. Allen &
Margaret F. Brinig, Child Support Guidelines: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly,
45 FAM. L.O. 135, 140 (2011); Garrison, supra note 4, at 60; Venohr, supra note
13, at 329.
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fathers (since the Guidelines tables flatten out 5 4 or are capped at
some income),55 but the positive relationship between total child
support ordered and the likelihood of motions means that the
higher income fathers are the ones most likely to seek to reduce
their financial burdens. Perhaps they do not think their children
actually need all the money ordered or are resentful that in fact
some of higher amounts inevitably goes to support purchases
that will benefit the mother as well. 5 6
Table V. Motions to Reduce Child Support
(Logistic Regression) (Indiana)57
B Sig.
.004 .7Father's Parenting Time Days (.003) 177
(007**
Total Amount of Child Support Ordered .0072 .001(.002)
Proportion of Father's Income Paid in Child Support (1.108) .278
Constant 2.325** 000(.504)
In Arizona, as can be seen from Table VI, motions to reduce
child support were not significantly related to the proportion of
income fathers were paying in child support but again were sig-
nificantly related to the total amount of child support ordered.
Having large amounts going from one household to the other
makes these motions more likely.58
54 Allen & Brinig, supra note 53, at 142-43 & Fig. 1.
55 See, e.g., Edgar v. Johnson, 731 P.2d 131 (Ariz. 1986); Ford v. Ford, 600
A.2d 25 (Del. 1991); J.C. v. E.M., 632 N.E.2d 429 (Mass. App. 1994); see Laura
Raatjes, High Income Child Support Guidelines: Harmonizing the Need for
Limits With the Best Interests of the Child, 86 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 317 (2010).
56 Ellman, Braver & MacCoun, supra note 9, found that the public (as
opposed to the payors of child support) did not object to the noncustodial par-
ent's supporting the custodial parent.
57 Cox and Snell R2 = .097.
58 Of course, in many circumstances reduction motions were entirely ap-
propriate. The Great Recession began in December of 2007, National Bureau
of Economic Research, U.S. Business Cycle Expansions and Contractions,
nber.org/cycles/html (last visited Feb. 19, 2016), so many of the fathers lost em-
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Table VI. Motions to Reduce Child Support
(Logistic Regression) (Arizona)59
B Sig.
Parenting Time for Fathers .002 .407
001**
Total Amount of Child Support Ordered (.000) .000
-167 90
Proportion of Father's Income Paid in Child Support (1389) 904
Constant -1.965** 000Constant ______ (.430) .000
Table VII. Relationship of Motions by Fathers
to Increase Their Share of Custodial Time
(Logistic Regression) (Arizona)6o
Variable B Sig. Exp(B)
Proportion of Father's Income Paid in 2.194 134 8.973Child Support (1.465)
Days of Father's Parenting Time .005 .159 1.005(.003)____
Post Divorce Motion by Mother for Less 1.63*** 000 5.146
Time for Father (.370) .
-3.027***Constant (.522) .000 .048
As previously observed, 61 shared parenting in the United
States does not currently seem to provoke drifts toward maternal
ployment, were rehired at lower wages, or had other reasons their incomes
declined.
59 Cox and Snell R2 = .033.
60 Cox and Snell R2 = .049. The R2 declines to .041 if the father's gross
income is substituted for the proportion of it paid in child support, and the
variable is much less close to statistical significance.
61 See sources cited in note 32, supra. See alo Venohr, supra note 13, at
342 ("Opponents also argue that the custodial parent's direct child-rearing ex-
penditures are not always significantly reduced where the child spends time
with the nonresidential parent and that low thresholds encourage parents to
bargaining the timesharing arrangement to raise or lower the amount of the
support award.").
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custody that occur outside the legal system.6 2 While this article
already discussed the strong and negative relationship between
the days of parenting time and the proportion of income paid in
child support (one that can be seen in the very large correlation
coefficient in Arizona), parallel to Tables II and III, Table VII
considers custodial stability as reflected in court proceedings.
Consistent with recent findings elsewhere, the second row shows
that when fathers have more parenting time, they are not statisti-
cally significantly likely to seek yet more custody, though the sign
is positive. Nor does the proportion of the father's income paid
in child support matter significantly. However, one interesting
observation is that some cases (16) have both motions to increase
and to decrease custodial time: fathers are statistically much
more likely to file for more custody if the mothers ask for less,
and vice-versa (row 3). These are highly litigious couples: four
had pre-divorce protective orders, six had supervised visitation at
some point, and five produced post-divorce protective orders.
Five involved allegations of substance abuse or mental illness and
two featured adultery. 63
Shared custody and attempts to pay less would seem more
likely in states like Arizona where the law does do not recognize
that while the noncustodial parent may be picking up expenses
(the variable costs like food, toothpaste, and laundry soap that
increase with his overnights with the children), the parent who
might have received sole custody in the late twentieth century is
not relieved of a large portion of the expenses associated with
the child. 6 4 To the extent that child support had as one of its goals
equalizing the standards of living in the two households, child
support rarely makes up the difference except for very wealthy
women. 6 5 Deductions from the amount she would otherwise re-
ceive may in fact place her below the poverty level. This practice
is particularly problematic, as Sanford Braver and his coauthors
62 But see the Department of Justice, Canadian Child Care Arrange-
ments, supra note 32, at 20; Fehlberg & Millward, supra note 32, at 32
(Australia).
63 The adultery cases were identified from child support worksheets
where other children biologically related to only one of the parents were born
during the marriage.
64 Braver, Ellman & Fabricius, supra note 22; Czapanskiy, supra note 22.
65 See, e.g., Fehlberg & Millward, supra note 32, at 38 (mothers more fi-
nancially disadvantaged, using qualitative Australian data).
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note, 6 6 when (1) there is no multiplier of the "base child support
amount" to account for the shared fixed expenses like rent and
heat, and (2) the father earns a much greater share of the total
income.67
Other states, like Wisconsin, use different Guideline meth-
ods and also treat shared parenting differently when calculating
the child support due. Wisconsin only counts the noncustodial
parent's income, and is therefore what is known as a percentage
of obligor income state.68 For two children, for example, the
noncustodial parent in Wisconsin typically owes 25% of his in-
come. For shared parenting, the amount otherwise owed is first
multiplied by 1.5, and then only variable expenses above a child's
basic needs are subtracted from the resulting product. The result
is that the higher amount (for the higher earning parent) is multi-
plied times the proportion of time in the other's custody. That
product is then subtracted from the amount he (typically) other-
wise would pay. Even at 50/50 sharing, the only time when noth-
ing will be paid would be when the two gross incomes are
equal.69
While the data did not contain enough unmarried couples to
know with any statistical certainty whether domestic violence
would increase with parenting time, 70 there was enough evidence
66 Braver, Ellman & Fabricius, supra note 22, at 437-39.
67 Czapanskiy, supra note 22.
68 See Allen & Brinig, supra note 53, at 144; Garrison, supra note 2, at 60;
Venohr, supra note 13, at 330 & Table I, 331-32.
69 Wisconsin Bureau of Child Support, Your Guide to Setting Support
Amounts 5, http://dcf.wisconsin.gov/publications/pdf/dcf-p-dwsc824.pdf (last
visited Oct. 24, 2016).
70 The original (larger) Indiana father pays sample contains 25 cases that
involved unmarried couples (seeking either custody (frequently where support
was not possible to ascertain), paternity and custody, or support (frequently not
involving parenting time)). These unmarried cases were more than twice as
likely to involve post-decree domestic violence. For those involving divorces,
4.4% had allegations of domestic violence post-decree. For the unmarried
couples, 11.5% involved allegations of post-decree domestic violence. ANOVA
indicates significance at .082. This is too small a sample to use for more sophis-
ticated analysis. For a recent case example, see In re Paternity of Pickett, 44
N.E.3d 756 (Ind. App. 2015), where an unmarried father exercised normal visi-
tation with the child, but the mother and father's relationship was "hostile and
turbulent" and both parents were found to have "engaged in conduct that was
destructive to Child." Id. at 760.
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in the present sample to show what seems to be happening with
highly conflicted divorcing and divorced couples. While states
may have. exceptions for equal parenting arrangements or even
overnights in cases involving proven domestic violence, failing to
discover or minimizing the significance of incurably conflicting
relationships 71 means that some children may not only suffer
lowered child support but may also continue exposure to conflict
and sometimes domestic violence.
The following two Tables (VIII and IX) show that parenting
time is not only related to income, but also to protective orders
or other indications of domestic violence that are sought after the
final decrees of divorce. Domestic violence complaints following
divorce are less apt than pre-divorce petitions to be strategic, 72
though in some cases they might produce changes in custody.
More time, and particularly, more frequent exchanges, with the
noncustodial parents was associated with more domestic violence
in both Indiana and Maricopa County, Arizona. These are very
simple regressions, but in both cases take into account income
71 The Arizona statutes state that in cases of significant domestic violence,
legal decision-making should not be shared, ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-403.03
(Westlaw through Second Regular Session of the Fifty-Second Legislature
(2016)), but allow shared parenting time if a parent has committed domestic
violence but can show that, with appropriate safeguards, parenting time will not
endanger the child or significantly impair the child's emotional development.
Id. § 25-403.03F. As noted in Brinig, supra note 33, the number of parenting
days in Maricopa County did not vary significantly based on an allegation of
pre-divorce domestic violence. In the overall Arizona sample, which does in-
clude father-custody divorces, the mean number of parenting days for cases in
which there were pre-divorce allegations of domestic violence was 99.71; with
106.4 without. This is not statistically significant (p < .287). In the father pays
Maricopa County sample, the difference was not significant either (p < .253),
and the difference was between 93.778 and 106.344 days.
72 See, e.g., Douglas W. Allen & Margaret F. Brinig, Do Joint Custody
Laws Make Any Difference? 8 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 304, 326 & Table 6
(2011) (finding some increase of unfounded, and therefore perhaps strategic,
abuse claims by both fathers and mothers following a change in the Oregon law
toward more equal parenting), Elizabeth S. Scott & Robert E. Emery, Gender
Politics and Child Custody: The Puzzling Persistence of the Best Interests Stan-
dard, 77 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 69, 81-82 (2014) (suggesting that many oppo-
nents of shared parenting were domestic violence advocates, while fathers
accused mothers of spurious accusations of domestic violence). The use of the
word "strategic" implies the allegation's attempting to affect bargaining over
marital property or very occasionally spousal support.
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(reflected in the basic child support obligation) and a measure of
the father's economic power in the divorced family (reflected in
his share of the total parental incomes), as well as whether there
had been a domestic violence-related complaint filed before
divorce.
Table VIII. Relationship Between Parenting
Time and Post-Decree Domestic Violence
(Indiana) (Logistic Regression, Standard
Errors in Parentheses)73
Variable B. Sig. Exp(B)
Days of Parenting Time by Fathers .033* .015 1.033
(.013)
Fathers Share of Combined Income .209 .952
(.036)
Basic Child Support Obligation -.002 .522 .998(.002)
Protective Order Sought at or Before 4.286** .001 72.690Divorce Complaint (1.260)
-4.286Constant (28) .059 .008(2.558)
The results here indicate that with each additional day of
parenting time over the mean (of 73 days in our sample; see Ta-
ble 1), the odds of having a post-decree allegation (or finding) of
domestic violence 74 (mean of .039 in our sample) increases by
about 3%, holding the other values constant. Seventy-three
overnights is slightly more than traditional "reasonable visita-
tion" of every other weekend (52 days) plus two weeks in the
summer (12 additional days) plus shared holidays and some
school breaks (8 additional days), amounting to 18.9% of the
time. Moving to every weekend would be 122 days (104 + 10 in
the summer +8 holidays and breaks), or an additional 49 days,
73 Cox and Snell R 2 = .125. * denotes significance at p < .05, ** denotes
significance at p < .01.
74 The violence might be directed at either parent, or be directed at or by
the new significant other, step-siblings, or the child. Again, to code for violence,
a court finding of substantiation was not required, so that domestic violence
may be overestimated. Having an allegation surface in court proceedings itself
probably underrepresents the existence of domestic violence, however.
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and would amount to 28.57% of the time. Since each day in-
creases the odds by just over 3%, this quite common arrange-
ment would change the probability of post-divorce domestic
violence to .062. Should the same logic hold true for unmarried
parents, who as noted experience more domestic violence in their
relationships, the concerns about insisting upon parenting orders
for them at the time support is established would be justified.
The question ultimately is whether exposing children to conflict
(let alone the possibility of physical harm to them or their par-
ents) is trumped by the usually beneficial effect of having both
parents involved in children's day-to-day upbringing or the
greater likelihood of recoupling public assistance.75
Table IX. Relationship Between Parenting Time
and Post-Decree Domestic Violence (Maricopa
County, Arizona) (Logistic Regression,
Standard Errors in Parentheses)76
Variable B Sig. Exp(B)
Days of Parenting Time .011* .054 1.011(.005)
Fathers' Share of Parents' Combined 
.020 .135 1.021Income (.014)
Protective Order Sought at or Before 1.694** .004 5.443
Divorce Complaint (.594) 004 5.443
Constant -4.762 .000 .009
75 For a discussion of these tradeoffs, see Margaret F. Brinig, Substantive
Parenting Arrangements in the USA: Unpacking the Policy Choices, 27 CHILD &
FAM. Q. 249, 255-57 (2015) (presenting the expert arguments for the various
propositions).
76 Cox and Snell R2 = .064. * denotes significance at p <.05 ** denotes
significance at p <.01. Again, the regression equation does not explain a great
amount of the variance in post-decree domestic violence. If the basic child
support obligation is included in the equation, the Cox and Snell R 2 decreases
to .056. Although the basic child support obligation is not statistically
significant, the father's share of the income increases in significance to p < .080
while the impact of parenting time becomes insignificant (though still positive)
at p < .169.
While in Maricopa County the increase of domestic violence is smaller, at
only 1.1% per day, the real impact is probably larger for two reasons. First, the
overall percentage is more than twice as high (.085, see Table I). Second, the
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Section IV. Summary: Which Way Does
Causation Run (or, Which Came First)?
At the time when courts and legislatures began to consider
the implications of couples divorcing, it was clear that child sup-
port flowed from custody.77 The question this paper addresses is
whether this remains true, for the most part. The tentative con-
clusion is that it does, with a few exceptions that may, consistent
with the reason that they run against the flow, not be the sound-
est public policy.
The literature and some evidence from the 1990s indicated
that at least for some cases and some fathers the process moved
in the other direction: that having to pay child support increased
fathers' demands for custody and that strategically they would
ask for more time with their children than they actually wanted
in order to reduce child support obligations.
Recent evidence, including the data studied here, does not
seem to bear this out either in the maternal drift pattern of "ac-
tual residence" distinct from court orders or in the legally formal-
ized motions to decrease parenting time made by mothers. That
is, even if fathers perhaps were motivated to seek equal time with
their children for less than altruistic reasons, the arrangements
appear stable without too many mother-child homes falling into
average parenting time is significantly higher (99 days per year, and about 25%
of divorcing couples have equal time). In that case, an increase would be from
99 to 183 days per year, or 84 days. Eighty-four times 1.1 is .924, meaning that
the odds of post-decree violence would nearly double, to 16.4 incidents per
hundred.
This can be seen if cases are separated into those with more than 143 days
of parenting time (essentially equal custody in the Arizona Child Support
Guidelines tables, warranting an adjustment of .307 to .486 of the total award).
For these 61 cases, the mean of domestic violence is 13%, while for those 173
without more equal parenting (less than 143 days), it is 6.9%. This result just
misses statistical significance at p < .139.
77 Attempts by some academics to set one off against the other were not
followed. Failure to allow visitation would not justify nonpayment of child sup-
port, as argued in Alison Kitch, Conditioning Child Support on Visitation: A
Proposal, 5 INT'L J. LAw, POL'Y & FAM. 318 (1991); and failure to pay child
support did not relieve the custodial parent of obligations to make the child
available for visitation, as proposed by Karen Czapanskiy, Child Support and
Visitation: Rethinking the Connections, 20 RUTGERS L.J. 619 (1989).
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poverty because of the lack of child support income.78 (The fact
that there are some, and that these tend to be where parents'
incomes are unequal, is certainly troubling.)
The movement to get voluntary parenting time orders in
child support establishment cases 79 is the exception that seems to
be running the other way. Child support establishment almost
always occurs when separating couples have never married in the
first place. 0 Orders are frequently sought when custodial
mothers are receiving public assistance and state child support
enforcement agencies are called upon to recoup the payments
from fathers. As Stacy Brustin and Lisa Martin argue,81 these
women may have decided not to marry because the child's fa-
thers were unstable, violent, or substance abusers. The men may
be incarcerated or otherwise provide poor role models for their
children. In some cases, the fathers may actually be paying "in-
formal" or "in kind" child support, which, though outside the le-
gal system, the mothers prefer.82 While thus far the federal
initiative is voluntary, meaning that both parents have to agree to
set the parenting plan, the implications are concerning. In its de-
sire to make collections easier (because of the connection, men-
78 Any shared parenting involving dual residences, as already mentioned,
will financially distress low-income families who cannot afford the necessary
duplication of resources. For these, it isn't payment of child support (or low or
small amounts ordered) that moves these families below the poverty line.
Also, the fact that it was the fathers with more parenting time that sought
increases in parenting time (see Table VII, row 2), may indicate that fathers
grow to appreciate the time with their children as they increase time spent with
them.
79 This would have been required as opposed to voluntary under the orig-
inal DHS proposals. See Brustin & Martin, supra note 30, at 807-08.
80 There were a few cases in my data where they had once married, sepa-
rated, had reconciled, and then separated again.
81 Brustin & Martin, supra note 30. For a discussion of why poor women
are unwilling to marry the fathers of their children, see KATHRYN EDIN & MA-
RIA KEFALAS, PROMISES I CAN KEEP: WHY POOR WOMEN PUT MOTHERHOOD
BEFORE MARRIAGE (with new preface by Frank Furstenberg, 2011). For a par-
allel discussion on poor men's reluctance to marry, see KATHRYN EDIN &
TIMOTHY J. NELSON, DOING THE BEST I CAN: FATHERHOOD IN THE INNER
CrrY (2013). See also NAOMI CAHN & JUNE CARBONE, MARRIAGE MARKETS:
How INEQUALITY Is REMAKING THE AMERICAN FAMILY (2015).
82 Solangel Maldonado, Deadbeat or Deadbroke: Redefining Child Sup-
port for Poor Fathers, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 991 (2006) (discussing these prac-
tices particularly among African-American men).
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tioned numerous times in this paper, between more parenting
and higher success at collecting the amounts due), coupled with a
strong rhetoric that having two involved parents leads to better
child outcomes,83 some women's decisions not to permanently at-
tach themselves to their children's fathers are clearly being sec-
ond-guessed. In cases involving intimate violence, more
prevalent among the poor84 and among unmarried couples,85
shared parenting and even visitation may not be appropriate.8 6
A brief look at 370 cases involving paternity actions from
one county in Indiana decided in 2008 indicates that this may be
the case. Table X shows that post-decree (here, a 2008 paternity
order) domestic violence is significantly related, as one would ex-
pect, to the father's prior involvement with the juvenile justice
system, and less obviously, to the mother's having legal represen-
tation while the father does not. While the number of parenting
days is positively related, 7 again, to the likelihood of post-decree
83 For recent discussions on the extent to which this is true in the best
scientific sense, see the special issue of FAMILY COURT REVIEW, April, 2014.
The introduction is by Marsha Kline Pruett & J. Herbie DiFonzo, Closing the
Gap: Research, Policy, Practice, and Shared Parenting, 52 FAM. CT. REV. 152
(2014).
84 See DEMIE KURz, FOR RICHER, FOR POORER: MOTHERS CONFRONT
DIVORCE (1995).
85 See, e.g., Susan L. Brown & Jennifer Roebuck Bulanda, Relationship
Violence in Young Adulthood: A Comparison of Daters, Cohabitors and Mar-
ried, 37 Soc. ScI. REs. 73, 79 & Table 1, 85 (2008) (using National Survey of
Adolescent Health, finding cohabiting young adults report relatively high level
of violence); Sonia M. Fras & Ronald J. Angel, The Risk of Partner Violence
Among Low-Income Hispanic Subgroups, 67 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 552, 559 &
Table 2 (2005) (cohabiting women had more violence, versus no violence, when
cohabiting, but more severe, as opposed to moderate, violence when
separated).
86 For an older discussion by two prominent sociologists along the same
lines, see Sara McLanahan & Judith Seltzer, Child-Support Enforcement and
Child Well-Being: Greater Security or Greater Conflict, in CHILD SUPPORT AND
CHILD WELL-BEING 250, 250-54 (Irwin Garfinkel, Sara McLanahan & Patricia
Robins, eds. 1994).
87 While 248 of the 375 cases reflected no overnights, the other 127 did.
The mean for this third of the sample was 107 days, while the median was 103,
consistent with custody every weekend. (There were 10 cases involving the
same judge/magistrate combination in which the mother was given custody but
more days were actually spent with the father than with her, accounting for the
difference). The mean including all the cases with no overnights was 36.44.
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domestic violence, controlling for income (proxied by the basic
child support obligation) and race, it is not statistically signifi-
cant. It is thus does nothing to alleviate or corroborate the Brus-
tin and Martin concern.
Table X. Relationship Between Parenting Time
and Post-Decree Domestic Violence in
Unmarried Couples (St. Joseph County,
Indiana) (Logistic Regression, Standard
Errors in Parentheses)88
Variable B Sig. Exp(B)
Days of Parenting Time .00 .160 1.004(.003)
Father's Involvement With Juvenile Justice 973* .020 2.647(.417)
Mother Only Has Attorney 1.021 .015 .360(.419)
Basic Child Support Obligation -.004 .386 .996(.005)
Father Is White .484 .258 1.622(.428)
-2.311**Constant 
-. 1 .000 .099
___________________________________ (.588) ___ ____
While simple fairness suggests that easy enforcement of
court orders should be available to either parent following di-
vorce, neither should be able to continue marital issues by tor-
menting or micromanaging the other's life either through
"punitive" child support enforcement or through abusing more
expansive parenting time procedures. Given the divorce re-
88 Cox and Snell R2 = .04. There were 387 cases in the entire sample, but
some files did not include child support worksheets so the basic obligation was
unknown. Indiana allows couples to voluntarily negotiate parenting time in
connection with a paternity proceeding, and if paternity is acknowledged by the
filing by both of an affidavit (followed by a paternity test), is presumed to
follow the state's Parenting Time Guidelines. The most frequent juvenile status
offenses of the fathers were truancy, disobedience, and runaway. The most
frequent delinquency offenses were theft, criminal trespass, and battery (though
there were many others).
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form's movement toward "clean breaks" of parents, 89 custodial
parents should not be able to force noncustodial parents to
"make career decisions based strictly on the size of their
paychecks, nor do the Guidelines require that parents work to
their full income potential."" Nor should they be able to
micromanage the other parent's lives as far as visitation and cus-
tody are concerned.91
89 For a recent discussion and comparison with European trends, see
CYNTHIA J. STARNES, THE MARRIAGE BUYOUT: THE TROUBLED TRAJECTORY
OF U.S. ALIMONY LAw (FAMILIES, LAW AND SoCIETY) 65 (2014).
90 Sandlin v. Sandlin, 972 N.E.2d 371, 375 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012).
91 See, e.g., Lynch v. Uhlenhopp, 78 N.W.2d 491 (Iowa 1956) (could not
enforce agreement to bring child up Catholic); Mord v. Peters, 571 So. 2d 981
(Miss. 1990) (custodial mother could not stop father from flying the twelve and
fifteen year-old children in his private plane); Brown v. Szakal, 514 A.2d 81
(N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1986) (refused to order non-Jewish non-custodial par-
ent to keep kosher and observe Sabbath when visiting with seven and nine year-
old daughters; the court wrote, "absent showing of emotional or physical harm
to the children, courts . . . will not impose upon the non-custodial parent the
burden of policing the religious instructions of the custodial parent." Id. at 84.);
Eichelberger v. Eichelberger, 345 S.E.2d 10 (Va. App. 1986) (custodial mother
wished to restrict usage of mini trail bike by their eight year-old on the father's
farm); Lundeen v. Struminger, 165 S.E.2d 285, 287 (Va. 1969) (direction in di-
vorce decree that children be raised in the Jewish faith and attend Sabbath
school violated state constitutional provisions that religion not be established).

